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ABSTRACT 
Our ongoing work aims at defining an ontology-centered 
approach for building expertise models for the Common-
KADS methodology. This approach (which we have 
named "OntoKADS") is founded on a core problem-
solving ontology which distinguishes between two concep-
tualization levels: at an object level, a set of concepts en-
able us to define classes of problem-solving situations, and 
at a meta level, a set of meta-concepts represent modeling 
primitives. In this article, our presentation of OntoKADS 
will focus on the core ontology and, in particular, on roles - 
the primitive situated at the interface between domain 
knowledge and reasoning, and whose ontological status is 
still much debated. We first propose a coherent, global, 
ontological framework which enables us to account for this 
primitive. We then show how this novel characterization of 
the primitive allows definition of new rules for the con-
struction of expertise models. 
 
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
I.2.4 [Artificial Intelligence]: Knowledge Representation 
Formalisms and Methods 
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INTRODUCTION 
Since the late 1990s, the construction of explicit ontologies 
has been considered as a promising way of improving the 
knowledge engineering process: the elaboration of domain, 
task and method ontologies early on in the design of prob-
lem-solving models was recommended [22]. At the same 
time, however, certain components of these problem-
solving models - notably roles - appeared to have been 
excluded from ontological treatment [23]. This component 
(referred to as a Knowledge role in the CommonKADS 
method [21] and situated at the interface between domain 
knowledge and reasoning) fulfils an important function: it 
must allow problem-solving methods to be specified in 
terms which are independent of particular application do-
mains, thus facilitating re-use of these generic methods. 
Even today, the extra-ontological status of this component 
does not seem to have progressed. In fact, methods which 
recommend the use of ontologies all resort to a syntactic 
ploy - transformation rules in PROTÉGÉ and bridges in 
UPML - to link domain knowledge and reasoning [6]. 
Here, we re-examine this presupposition. We show that 
recent progress in the field of formal ontologies enables 
one to account for this component in semantic terms, 
within a coherent ontological framework. 
In our previous work [14], we suggested drawing a distinc-
tion between two types of role: roles played by objects (e.g. 
Physician, Student) and those played by concepts (e.g. Hy-
pothesis, Sign). After having likened the latter to Common-
KADS' Knowledge roles, we gave them the status of a meta-
property, i.e. along the same lines as Guarino's proposal 
(making the role concept appear in an ontology of univer-
sals [12]). However, in 1999, we were not in a position to 
provide a coherent ontological framework to account for 
CommonKADS expertise models in their entirety. 
Today, we are tackling this issue by using the OntoKADS 
method [3]. OntoKADS benefits from a broad range of 
recent work and progress in i) clarifying the notion of role 
in ontological terms [16][18] ; ii) defining (via use of rich 
axiomatic) a top-level ontology such as DOLCE, the struc-
turing principles of which are explicit [17] ; iii) integrating 
mental representations (reified entities) like Propositions 
[8] / Descriptions [11] into an ontology; and iv) defining an 
ontology of meta-properties based on a set of clearly iden-
tified primitives (rigidity, dependence, identity) [12]. 
Hence, we now possess an ontological tool-box which is 
both necessary and sufficient for making this type of pro-
posal. 
In the following sections of this article1, we first present an 
overview of the OntoKADS method and then focus on its 
core problem-solving ontology, with particular emphasis 
on the part of the ontology that deals with roles. 
                                                                 
1 This article is an extended version of [3]. 
OVERVIEW OF OntoKADS 
 
Our proposal consists of a methodology called OntoKADS 
which, to a great extent, likens the construction of expertise 
models to the construction of ontologies. The method com-
prises two main steps (see Figure 1). 
In a first step, the knowledge engineer develops a problem-
solving-driven application ontology whose concepts are 
labeled by modeling primitives. To do this, the method 
uses an ontology (also named OntoKADS) composed of 
two main sub-ontologies:  
• A core problem-solving sub-ontology which enables 
the engineer to define (by specialization) the applica-
tion's concepts and specific reasonings. This sub-
ontology extends the high-level DOLCE ontology (De-
scriptive Ontology for Linguistic and Cognitive Engi-
neering) [17]2. 
• A meta-level sub-ontology coding the modeling primi-
tives, which allows the engineer to label the concepts 
from the previous ontology by using meta-properties 
which represent modeling primitives. This type of 
practice is analogous to the labeling advocated in the 
OntoClean method [13]3. 
A software module (see Figure 1) then automatically trans-
lates this labeled ontology into three subcomponents of an 
expertise model which resembles CommonKADS [21]: a 
domain model, an inference model and a task model. This 
translation principally involves the extraction and reorgani-
zation of representations. 
In a second step, the knowledge engineer further specifies 
the problem-solving methods linked to the tasks which 
he/she has identified. 
A software environment for running this method is cur-
rently being developed (in the Conclusion section, we ex-
plain our choice of software tools). In the remainder of this 
article, our presentation of OntoKADS will concentrate on 
describing the ontology's content. We shall first show how 
the OntoKADS core ontology extends the DOLCE high-
level ontology. 
                                                                 
2 This ontology was chosen mainly for the reasons outlined in the Intro-
duction but also because it integrates a class of mental objects which 
turn out to be very important for analyzing problem-solving knowledge. 
3 Even though the goals are different a priori (building an expertise model 
vs. verifying the logical coherence of subsumption links), we shall see 
that the labeling meta-properties are of the same nature. 
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Figure 1. Main steps in the OntoKADS method. 
HOW OntoKADS EXTENDS DOLCE 
DOLCE and the notion of knowledge 
The OntoKADS ontology is defined as an extension of the 
DOLCE ontology, which means that OntoKADS' concepts 
and relations are defined by specialization of the abstract 
concepts and relationships present in DOLCE. DOLCE's 
domain, i.e. the set of entities classified by the ontology's 
concepts (referred to as a set of particulars, PT) is divided 
into four sub-domains. For the purposes of this article, we 
consider only two of these here (see Figure 2): 
• The endurants (ED). These are entities which "are in 
time" and are wholly present whenever they are pre-
sent (objects, substances and also ideas). Within this 
sub-domain, one can distinguish physical objects 
(POB) and non-physical objects (NPOB), depending 
on whether or not the objects have a direct physical lo-
cation. 
• The perdurants (PD). These are entities which "occur 
in time" but are only partially present at any time they 
are present (events and states). Within this sub-
domain, one can distinguish events (EV) and statives 
(STV) according to a "cumulativity" principle: the 
mereological sum of two instances of a stative (for ex-
ample, "being seated") is an instance of the same type, 
which is not the case for the sum of instances of 
events, for example the K-CAP 2003 and K-CAP 2005 
conferences. The latter (not being atomic) are consid-
ered to be accomplishments (ACC). 
The main relationship between endurants and perdurants is 
that of participation, with PC(x,y,t) holding for: "x (neces-
sarily an endurant) participates in y (necessarily a per-
durant) at time t". For example, the co-authors of this arti-
cle (endurants) participated in the drafting of the text (a 
perdurant). 
More particularly in terms of the domain of knowledge 
which directly involves OntoKADS, DOLCE's commit-
ment (corresponding to a consensus viewpoint within the 
AI and KE communities) can be summarized as follows4: 
• Knowledge is the ability of an entity to perform an 
action, i.e. to produce changes in a world. The notion 
of "ability" implies that knowledge is of ideal order 
and that it does not coincide with any of the performed 
actions: knowledge is concerned with a mental world 
or, in other words, with mental objects (MOB) which 
are non-physical private objects for (which belong to) 
the entity, whereas the action is a perdurant.  
 
• This knowledge or ability is embodied by an entity 
(the agentive5), which confers the latter with the poten-
tial to repeat actions in which it participates (in terms 
of the PC relationship) as an agent. Here, the agentive 
concept covers both the notion of an intentional agent 
[5] (i.e. an agent which is driven by a goal - represen-
tation of a desired world state) and that of a rational 
agent [19] (i.e. an agent which uses appropriate re-
sources to achieve the goals that it has set itself). 
The action (AC) is defined in DOLCE-Lite+ as an "ac-
complishment exemplifying the intentionality of an agent"6. 
The abstract characterization of agent/agentive applies to 
entities with very wide-ranging physical characteristics: a 
human being, a robot or a knowledge-based system. 
 
 
Figure 2. Excerpt from the DOLCE ontology  
The two main sub-ontologies in OntoKADS 
The OntoKADS ontology includes two sub-ontologies: a 
problem-solving ontology (which is independent of Com-
monKADS) and an ontology for modeling primitives close 
to those in CommonKADS. In the rest of this article and in 
order notably to illustrate the first sub-ontology, we will 
consider two examples of problem-solving situations: di-
agnosing a car breakdown and calibrating a simulation 
                                                                 
4 More precisely, DOLCE's commitment appears to us to be coherent with 
this point of view. 
5 The agentive property in DOLCE is not found in isolation but corre-
sponds to the extensional union of the agentive physical object (APO) 
and agentive social object (ASO) properties. 
6 DOLCE-Lite+ contains various DOLCE extensions under study. The 
extensions are presented in [17, chapt. 15]. 
code. The first example corresponds to the teaching exam-
ple dealt with in the CommonKADS reference book [21]. 
The second corresponds to an application which we are 
currently using to evaluate OntoKADS [4]7. 
The first sub-ontology extends DOLCE in order to enable 
description of problem-solving activities. This proposed 
extension takes into account an analysis of existing prob-
lem-solving models and notably those created using the 
CommonKADS method. Analysis of the models shows that 
two distinct, general categories of actions suffice for tack-
ling problem-solving activities, regardless of the latter's 
complexity: Reasonings and Communications8. 
We define Reasonings (e.g. diagnosing a breakdown, cali-
brating a simulation code, putting forward a hypothesis) as 
actions (A1) which aim at transforming the agent-
Reasoner's mental world. Reasonings contrast in this re-
spect with actions, which seek to transform the real world. 
The modification does not concern the real world but the 
representation that the Reasoner makes of the real world - 
in other words, mental objects. These are carried out by a 
human being or a (knowledge-based) system and may re-
quire the latter to interact with another human being or 
system - if only to exchange information with the outside 
world.  
We liken an Interaction to an action whose performance is 
influenced by another agentive: this influence translates 
into participation (in one way or another) in the same ac-
tion (D1). Within Interactions, we consider Communica-
tions, classified as Interactions whose goal is to exchange 
information9 (A2). Communications may correspond to 
simple enunciations (e.g. presenting a result) or more com-
plex Interactions made up of several enunciations involv-
ing different enunciators (e.g. obtaining/receiving informa-
tion). On the basis of distinct goals (transforming the rea-
soner's mental world vs. exchanging information), we con-
sider that Reasonings and Communications are distinct 
actions (A3). 
(A1) Reasoning(x) → AC(x) 
(D1) Interaction(x) =def AC(x) ∧∃yzt(isAgentOf(y,x) ∧ 
z≠y ∧ (APO(z) ∨ ASO(z)) ∧ PC(z,x,t)) 
(A2) Communication(x) → Interaction(x) 
(A3) Reasoning(x) → ¬Communication(x) 
                                                                 
7 A simulation code implements a model of a class of systems. In order to 
simulate the behavior of a given system, it is necessary to calibrate the 
model by adjusting it to the particular characteristics of the system in 
question. 
8 In the rest of the article and in order to distinguish OntoKADS categories 
from those of DOLCE, the names of the former will be noted in a 
JAVA-like notation (e.g. CalibrationData, isAuthorOf), whereas abbre-
viations for the latter (e.g. ED, AC) will be used in the axioms. 
9 In the current version of OntoKADS, only these Interactions are consid-
ered. In particular, we do not take account of collaborative, problem-
solving activities and the coordination mechanisms with which these ac-
tivities are associated. 
The second OntoKADS sub-ontology represents the mod-
eling primitives of the CommonKADS method (or, more 
precisely, the new primitives defined for OntoKADS: Task, 
Inference, FormalKnowledgeRole, DomainConcept). 
Technically, we consider that this ontology is situated at a 
"meta" level with respect to the previous one, and thus cor-
responds to an ontology of meta-properties. These meta-
properties enable classification of the problem-solving on-
tology's concepts according to the relation CF(x,y,t), which 
stands for "x classifies y at time t"10. This relationship al-
lows us to specify (for example) that the Diagnosis concept 
is modeled as a Task at a certain time t1 (A4), that the Cali-
brationData concept is considered to be a FormalKnowl-
edgeRole (A5) or indeed that EmptyFuelTank is a Do-
mainConcept (A6).  
The times ti correspond to building times for the expertise 
model, and the classifications can change over time: hence, 
according to the CommonKADS method, a particular Rea-
soning may be considered as an Inference at a given mo-
ment and as a Task at another moment (if combined with a 
decomposition method). The classifications are additionally 
accompanied by constraints which express the fact that a 
modeling primitive can only classify certain types of con-
cepts in the problem-solving ontology. For example, (A7) 
and (A8) express the fact that the Task primitive can only 
classify concepts subsumed by the Reasoning concept and 
that the TransferFunction concept can only classify Com-
munications11. Figure 3 provides a graphic summary of 
several constraints (the modeling primitives are noted in 
bold characters). 
(A4) classify(Task,Diagnosis,t1) 
(A5) classify(FormalKnowledgeRole, Calibration-
Data,t2) 
(A6) classify(DomainConcept,EmptyFuelTank,t3) 
(A7) classify(Task,x,t) → subsumes(Reasoning,x) 
(A8) classify(TransferFunction,x,t) → sub-
sumes(Communication,x) 
In this section, we introduced OntoKADS' core problem-
solving ontology by adopting the standpoint of the per-
durants (Reasonings and Communications). In the next 
section, we tackle analysis of the endurants which partici-
pate in these perdurants. This leads us to define modeling 
primitives which correspond to knowledge roles in the 
CommonKADS method. 
 
                                                                 
10 This relation was introduced in [18] so as to account for the temporal 
classification of an instance by a concept. Here, we extend its signature 
by considering that the instance can be a concept classified by a meta-
property. 
11 The relation subsume(x,y) signifies that all instances of the concept y 
are necessarily instances of the concept x. 
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Figure 3. Structure of the OntoKADS ontology  
The OntoKADS kernel 
In this section, we show how OntoKADS can answer the 
following questions: what is the ontological nature of the 
entities participating in Reasonings and Communications? 
How do these entities participate in actions? How can we 
characterize (in terms of meta-properties) the concepts rep-
resenting such participation modes? 
Theoretical and practical knowledge and its 
objects 
Let us return to the notion of knowledge. By admitting that 
all knowledge is knowledge about "something", about an 
"object", we can schematically distinguish between two 
categories of knowledge, depending on the nature of the 
objects (physical or mental) with which it deals [2]: 
• practical knowledge (i.e. know-how “to act”) deals 
with physical objects and enables action in the real 
world (e.g. banging in a nail, riding a bicycle). 
• theoretical knowledge (i.e. know-how “to think”) 
deals with theoretical objects (mental objects) and en-
ables action in the mental world (e.g. calculating, de-
ciding). 
According to our definition, every action is based (at least 
in part) on theoretical knowledge - knowledge of the goal, 
representation of a desired world state. The goal certainly 
exists (as a mental object), whereas if the action fails, the 
desired world state may not be reached and thus may not 
exist. An action in the real world thus involves hybrid 
knowledge. What is the situation for Reasonings and Com-
munications?  
By defining Reasoning as an action seeking to transform 
the agent's mental world, we have forced its result - if one 
exists - to be a mental object. The term "result" (like the 
term "goal") can be likened to ways in which entities (men-
tal objects in this instance) participate (as understood in 
DOLCE's PC relationship) in Reasonings. Two other par-
ticipants enable us to define Reasonings: the data and the 
solving method. We complete the characterization of Rea-
sonings by equally likening these participants to mental 
objects, which boils down to considering that by their very 
essence, Reasonings only involve theoretical knowledge12. 
As for Communications, and by complementing the par-
ticipation of mental objects, the exchange of information 
between agents requires use of physical objects which 
"convey" information – “documents”, in other words. 
In order to clarify the links between the mental objects par-
ticipating in Reasonings and the documents on one hand 
and the way in which mental objects refer to a domain's 
physical objects on the other, it is necessary to specify their 
respective nature more fully. To achieve this, OntoKADS 
calls on the I&DA ontology, defined as an extension of 
DOLCE and designed to enable description of documents 
according to their content [8]. 
Population of mental objects in I&DA 
In order to account for documents and their content, I&DA 
distinguishes between three types of entity: 
• The Document. A Document corresponds to a medium 
bearing a semiotic inscription of knowledge13.  
• The Expression. An Expression corresponds to the 
perceived signifier, expressed in a communication 
code. An example of an Expression is Text - a system 
of signifying units (words and phrases) structured ac-
cording to language-defined rules. 
• The Content. A Content corresponds to the Expres-
sion's signified. In functional terms, two signifieds can 
be distinguished: the Proposition (as a place of truth), 
and the Concept, (as a means of reference, i.e. for clas-
sifying entities). Let us add (and this a point that turns 
out to be important for OntoKADS) that a Proposition 
"uses" or "has for its subject" Concepts (the hasFor-
Subject relation) (A9)(D2). 
(A9) hasForSubject(x,y) → Proposition(x) ∧ Con-
cept(y) 
(D2) Subject(x) =def Concept(x) ∧ ∃y(Proposition(y) ∧ 
hasForSubject(y,x)) 
I&DA thus distinguishes between two general categories of 
mental objects, one (the Expression) depending on a com-
munication code and the other (the Content) being code-
independent. This enables us to consider that any given 
Content can be expressed (using different communication 
codes) by different Expressions and, equally, that any 
given Expression can be performed by different material 
                                                                 
12 This type of hypothesis may appear to be surprising, a priori. Hence, for 
example, a Reasoning such as a numerical calculation can be performed 
mentally, on paper, with a calculator or by using another agent-
calculator. The point here is that the eventualities depend on the meth-
ods implemented in given calculation situations. The eventualities are 
therefore accidental and do not affect the essence of calculation. In con-
trast, we consider the data and the solving method to be essential par-
ticipants. 
13 This definition enables one to account for very diverse documents, 
ranging from a sheet of paper bearing a form materialized by ink to the 
air around us carrying a sound wave which materializes what we hear. 
inscriptions which may potentially solicit various senses on 
the receptor side (e.g. sound, visual or tactile inscriptions). 
Finally, I&DA introduces a signifier-signified pairing 
which specializes in the communication of information 
between agents: the Discourse (likened to a statement) and 
its content, the Message. The Message is a Proposition, the 
result of a discursive act - for example, informing someone 
of something (for Information) or complaining about some-
thing (for a Complaint). 
 
Figure 4. Top levels of the I&DA ontology 
Nature of the participating entities  
The I&DA ontology enables one to specify the viewpoint 
adopted in OntoKADS in terms of the ontological nature of 
entities which participate notably14 in Reasonings: these are 
Contents or, in other words, Concepts or Propositions 
which have Concepts as their Subject. This identity appears 
to be both pertinent and sufficiently general to account for 
the meaning of the following expressions (which appear as 
task data in CommonKADS expertise models): EmptyFu-
elTank, EmptyFuelTankHypothesis, LowBatteryLevelCom-
plaint and CarModel. 
This status of Content clarifies the link which exists be-
tween entities participating in Reasonings (which are men-
tal objects), and the real world entities to which the mental 
objects refer: the real world entities only participate indi-
rectly in Reasonings: that is to say, in as much as they are 
classified by a Concept. Hence, the expression "empty fuel 
tank" can be likened to the Concept of a class of states or to 
an Assertion (a Proposition considered to be true for an 
agent) whose Subject is the said Concept. 
The usefulness of this interpretation is that one obtains a 
model which complies with the signature of DOLCE's PC 
participation relation: since a Content is an endurant, it is 
clear that an endurant participates in perdurant-Reasoning. 
It is also noteworthy that the Concept (either alone or play-
ing the role of a Subject) can vary and may correspond to a 
Concept of state, process or behavior. The latter perdurants 
can then be classified according to an agent's perception 
                                                                 
14 In the remainder of this section and for reasons of space, our main inter-
est is Reasonings and, furthermore, we center our analysis on the Rea-
sonings' data and results. 
mode (e.g. visible, invisible, observed, observable, etc.) or 
an abnormal (e.g. pathological) characteristic. 
The above remark clarifies the generality of the modeling 
framework. In order to broaden its scope, we should add 
that a Proposition can be the result of particular Reason-
ings or indeed Communications when a Message is trans-
mitted between agents. The expressions "empty fuel tank 
hypothesis" and "low battery level complaint" can thus be 
likened to Propositions resulting respectively from hypo-
thetical reasoning and a discursive act consisting in "com-
plaining about something". 
In order to further emphasize the generality of this model-
ing framework, we note finally that a model (for example a 
CarModel) can be likened to a Proposition. This category 
covers knowledge models exploited by Reasonings as well 
as mathematical models used to simulate system behavior. 
Participation modes 
However general it may be, the framework outlined so far 
remains incomplete because it does not allow us to account 
for expressions like "diagnosis hypothesis", "model to cali-
brate" or "calibrated model". This type of expression - use-
ful for naming knowledge roles (in the CommonKADS 
sense) in task inputs and outputs [4] refers, in fact, to ways 
in which Contents participate in Reasonings, for example 
as data or results. This "participation mode" domain is cov-
ered by a specific OntoKADS component - a sub-ontology 
of "participation roles". 
These roles (also referred to as "casual roles" or "thematic 
roles" in the literature) are defined in OntoKADS as par-
ticularizing the endurant concept. In fact, DOLCE's 
axiomization assimilates the notions of endurant and par-
ticipant15. Hence, the participation roles or specialized par-
ticipants are defined by introducing relationships which 
particularize the PC participation equation. 
In this section and by way of illustration, we shall define 
first the Patient role using the isAffectedBy relation 
(A10)(D3)(T1) and then the specialized Data role using the 
isDataOf relation (A11-13)(D4)(T2-3). It is noteworthy 
that we have forced the Data i) to be a Content participat-
ing in an Action (A12) and ii) to participate from the start 
of the perdurant onwards (A13) (in contrast, the Result 
participates at the end of the perdurant). Finally, Calibra-
tionData is defined as data for a particular Reasoning (a 
Calibrating (D5)) and a ModelToCalibrate is defined as a 
Model playing the role of CalibrationData (D6). 
(A10) isAffectedBy(x,y) → ∃t(PC(x,y,t)) 
(D3) Patient(x) =def ∃y(isAffectedBy(x,y)) 
(T1) Patient(x) → ED(x) 
                                                                 
15 According to DOLCE axioms: Ad33 (PC(x,y,t) → ED(x) ∧ PD(y) ∧ 
T(t)) and Ad35 (ED(x) → ∃y,t(PC(x,y,t))), only the endurants partici-
pate in the perdurants and, incidentally, all endurants participate neces-
sarily in a perdurant. 
(A11) isDataOf(x,y) → isAffectedBy(x,y) 
(A12) isDataOf(x,y) → Content(x) ∧ Action(y) 
(A13) isDataOf(x,y) →∃t∀t’((PRE(y,t’) ∧ t’≤t)  
                                                     → PC(x,y,t’)) 
(D4) Data(x) =def isDataOf(x,y) 
(T2) Data(x) → Patient(x) 
(T3) Data(x) → Content(x) 
(D5) CalibrationData(x) =def ∃y(isDataOf(x,y) ∧  
                                                               Calibrating(y)) 
(D6) ModelToCalibrate(x) =def Model(x) ∧ 
                                                          CalibrationData(x) 
The modeling primitive: KnowledgeRole 
In our modeling of Reasonings, we were careful to charac-
terize separately the nature of the participating entities on 
one hand and the nature of the participation modes on the 
other. In the CommonKADS method, this distinction re-
flects the difference between two modeling primitives, the 
"domain concept" primitive and the "knowledge role" 
primitive. In this section, we focus on the latter by showing 
how it can be ontologically founded. We end by defining 
novel modeling primitives for the OntoKADS method. 
To achieve this, we have adopted the ontology of meta-
properties defined in [12] as our reference framework. We 
also adopt their definition of three meta-properties involv-
ing a notion of "role": role, formal role and material role.  
• A role is an anti-rigid16 concept which depends on an 
external entity. Its anti-rigidity, (i.e. the property of be-
ing non-essential for all its instances) translates into 
dynamic behavior over time: an instance only plays a 
role by accident. Its dependence translates the fact that 
playing this role (for a given instance) necessarily im-
plies the existence of another (external) instance. 
• A formal role is a role which does not carry an identity 
criterion. A formal role restricts itself to characterizing 
a dependence mode vis-à-vis another entity, without 
constraining the identity of the entity playing the role. 
The Agent and Patient concepts (which we qualified as 
"participation roles") are examples of formal roles. At 
the beginning of this article, we notably saw that agen-
tives possessing very varied identity criteria can play 
the role of Agent. 
• A material role is a role carrying an identity criterion. 
A material role is usually subsumed by a formal role 
(from which it inherits its anti-rigidity and external de-
pendence properties) and by a type (from which it in-
herits an identity criterion). Examples of material roles 
are the Student and Employee concepts defined as Per-
                                                                 
16 For reasons of space, we are not able to give the notions’ formal defini-
tions here. The reader is invited to refer to [12]. 
sons (a type) playing a formal role vis-à-vis a health-
care establishment or an employer.  
By analogy with this reference framework and by particu-
larizing it to the entities of the OntoKADS domain (i.e. 
entities participating in Reasonings) we define three no-
tions of "reasoning roles" or "knowledge roles" (adopting 
the name of the primitive in CommonKADS). Figure 5 
provides a graphical illustration of the concepts labeling 
using these meta-properties. 
• a KnowledgeRole is a role which must be played by a 
Content and must depend on an action, a Reasoning or 
a Communication. 
• a FormalKnowledgeRole is a KnowledgeRole which 
does not carry an identity criterion. The Data and Re-
sult concepts (and more specifically CalibrationData 
and DiagnosisResult) are examples of this. The roles 
can be played by Concepts or Propositions which are 
Contents carrying incompatible identity criteria. 
• a MaterialKnowledgeRole is a KnowledgeRole carry-
ing an identity criterion. The ModelToCalibrate and 
DiagnosisHypothesis concepts are examples of this. 
Each is subsumed (see Figure 5) by a FormalKnowl-
edgeRole (CalibrationData and DiagnosisResult re-
spectively) and by a type (Model, Hypothesis) which 
brings an identity criterion. 
Finally, the resulting modeling framework for entities par-
ticipating in Reasonings can be summarized as follows: 
• The KnowledgeRole, FormalKnowledgeRole and Ma-
terialKnowledgeRole modeling primitives are (like the 
other primitives) meta-properties, i.e. properties which 
classify other properties temporally. 
• These meta-properties classify participation roles in 
Reasonings. The Inputs and the Outputs (primitives 
particularizing the KnowledgeRole primitive) classify 
Data and Results, respectively. 
• The Data and Results are played by Contents, Con-
cepts or Propositions which have Concepts as subjects. 
• These latter Concepts classify the domain objects, their 
components and the states and processes in which 
these objects intervene. 
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Figure 5. Labeling of participants using KnowledgeRoles 
DISCUSSION 
The OntoKADS core problem-solving ontology prompts a 
knowledge modeling process which differs significantly 
from that proposed by CommonKADS. Schematically, 
OntoKADS requires more comprehensive specification of 
the ontological commitments for the conceptual entities 
concerned before “putting in primitives” these entities. The 
difference is most notable for Reasonings and their partici-
pants. 
The OntoKADS modeling framework for Reasonings 
brings new light on the CommonKADS knowledge role 
primitive. The categories that are usually selected for 
knowledge roles in CommonKADS models correspond to 
categories of Concepts and Propositions in OntoKADS. 
These categories deal with the domain of representations: 
this explains why the terms designating knowledge roles 
may be independent of the field of application. 
OntoKADS replaces the CommonKADS knowledge roles 
(which are poorly defined in semantic terms) by Materi-
alKnowledgeRoles, whose definition is based on a rigorous 
framework (in particular, these concepts must verify certain 
meta-properties). This framework provides the modeler 
with rules which allow him/her to identify these roles, by 
forcing him/her to answer the following questions: i) which 
type of representation is participating (e.g. message, model, 
assertion, hypothesis)? If applicable, what is the subject of 
the representation (e.g. a complaint about the state of the 
car, a model of the car's poor behavior, a hypothesis con-
cerning the car's malfunction)?, ii) is this Data or a Result? 
and iii) what sort of Reasoning is concerned? 
Application of these rules leads to expertise models which 
differ from those obtained using the CommonKADS 
method. Our current work involves comparing these mod-
els by using examples of generic tasks and methods from 
the literature.  
RELATED ONTOLOGICAL WORK 
A critical aspect for OntoKADS is investigation of the 
theoretical objects which participate in Reasonings - ob-
jects which we have likened (using I&DA) to Concepts and 
Propositions [8] defined as mental objects (as understood 
in DOLCE). Other ontological works have also tackled this 
field by pursuing a range of objectives: 
• modeling document content for the SUMO ontology's 
"practical semiotics" [20] or, more specifically, the 
origin of information contained in web pages for Fox 
and Huang's ontology of propositions [9]. 
• modeling reified entities (e.g. standards, plans, meth-
ods, diagnoses, etc.) for the D&S ontology (Descrip-
tions and Situations) [11]. 
• modeling an agent's mental states (e.g. beliefs, desires, 
intentions, etc.) and their links to mental objects for the 
COM ontology (Computational Ontology of Mind) [7]. 
The lack of a rigorous framework of definitions (such as 
that provided by the DOLCE functional ontology) in [20] 
and [9] entails that comparing conceptualizations is a deli-
cate task. For example, entities referred to as "propositions" 
are defined by both ontologies as "abstract entities corre-
sponding to document content". However, this characteri-
zation alone does not enable one to know (amongst other 
things) whether these are endurant or atemporal entities or 
whether the representations are subjective (agent-
dependent) or objective. The two other ontologies (D&S 
and COM) are, in contrast, defined as extensions of 
DOLCE, which facilitates comparisons. 
The COM ontology [7] appears to complement OntoKADS 
in all respects. Its domain is composed of two disjoint sub-
domains: i) mental states, which one can consider as being 
parts (as understood in the P "is part of" relationship in 
DOLCE) of Reasonings. In particular, one can set any Rea-
soning (or, more generally, any action) to include an inten-
tion; and ii) mental objects, divided into percepts (direct 
representations of the real world) and computed objects 
(the results of cognitive processes). It appears clear that the 
Concepts and Propositions in OntoKADS can be defined 
as computed objects. On the other hand, one can set COM's 
computed intentions to correspond to Propositions in On-
toKADS. On this basis, a merger between COM and On-
toKADS seems to be possible.  
The D&S ontology [11] and its extension to information 
objects (both of which are included in DOLCE-Lite+ [17, 
chapt. 15]) appear to cover the same domain as I&DA if 
one performs the following alignment: the reified theories 
or s-descriptions in D&S correspond to Propositions in 
I&DA, the reified concepts or c-descriptions correspond to 
Concepts and the information objects correspond to Ex-
pressions. In fact, the s-descriptions (following the exam-
ple of Propositions) subsume entities as diverse as objec-
tives, methods and diagnoses and are expressed by infor-
mation objects. However, differences do exist, as shown by 
the recent application of D&S to construction of a core 
biomedical ontology [10].  
Certain c-descriptions (referred to as parameters) reify 
constraints on regions (as understood in DOLCE). For ex-
ample, according to D&S, the fever and critical systolic 
blood pressure parameters "select" a body temperature 
sub-region and a blood pressure sub-region, respectively. 
In contrast, in OntoKADS, such concepts are likened to 
concepts of states or processes (perdurants). These con-
cepts can then play the role of Signs by enabling the evoca-
tion of other concepts [14]. Hence, the Concept in Onto-
KADS does not subsume (following the example of c-
description) the Fever or CriticalSystolicBloodPressure 
concepts but does subsume the Sign concept, representing a 
role played by a Concept during a Reasoning (according to 
our definitions, the Sign concept is a FormalKnowl-
edgeRole). The D&S c-description concept is thus quite 
different from the Concept in OntoKADS. 
These comparisons demonstrate that ontological investiga-
tions in the field of knowledge objects are underway but 
that work is dispersed and, as we have seen, lacks consen-
sus. Hence, at present, the domain is largely an open field 
for research. With OntoKADS, we are pursuing a dual ob-
jective: i) extending its domain so as to take account of 
other important knowledge objects for modeling problem-
solving situations, notably objectives and solving methods; 
ii) challenging this modeling framework with the main ge-
neric tasks (Reasonings) and methods from the literature. 
CONCLUSION 
In the present article, we have set the foundations of a radi-
cally ontology-centered approach to the construction of 
expertise models. Our OntoKADS method is based on a 
core problem-solving ontology labeled with meta-
properties (modeling primitives) that the designer com-
pletes in order to account for application-specific reason-
ings. We defend the following thesis: recent progress in the 
field of formal ontologies (and notably work in the area of 
reasoning objects) means that such an approach is now 
within our reach. 
Our work in defining OntoKADS continues in two direc-
tions. As we saw in the previous section, the ontology itself 
is being expanded. In addition, the design of a software 
environment for the method is now underway. This envi-
ronment is defined as an extension of the TERMINAE on-
tology construction platform [1] and uses the OntoSpec 
semi-informal ontology specification language [15].  
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